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Abstract
This paper aims to clarify the characteristics of French white collar workers'labour
markets by examining how higher positions, i. e. the professional/managerial posts (Cadres)
and the senior managerial posts, are filled. The analysis shows that though there exist a vane-
ty of routes for promotion of white-collar workers, many of the managers are internally
promoted except technical managers and managers in commercial sector.
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I. INTRODUCTION
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A wide range of contradicting views exist on the subject of white-collar workers'
labour markets in European countries. Those researchers who lay stress on white-collar
workers'firm-specific human capital assert that ‖in every country white-collar workers'
internal promotion is the mainstream type in general." On the other hand, there are
researchers who assert that white-collar workers pursue their career and their higher
wages m external labour markets which are founded on general human capital. Thus
its actual state has not been sufficiently clarified.
It is said that France is one of the countries where internal labour markets are well-
developed.1'One way to test the predominance of internal labour markets over external
labour markets is to examine the link between earnings and length of service with curr-
ent employer (hereafter referred to as tenure). International comparison of wage func-
tions which was recently conducted shows that, in France, tenure does not have strong
effect upon earnings compare to other industrial countries.2'Moreover, the preceding
researches which analysed the wage functions of French male workers demonstrates
that the coefficient of tenure, particularly that of white-collar workers considerably
lowered in the 1980s.3'
However, it is well known that there are various kinds of estimation bias in the
coefficient of tenure in wage functions. For example, the American empirical researches
point out that coefficient of tenure which is seen in the cross-sectional data does not
indicate the wage rise effect but is merely a statistical artifact.4'Therefore, it would be
premature to conclude from these preceding researches that internal labour markets
are no more predominant in French white-collar labour market.
This paper aims to clarify the characteristics of French white-collar workers'labour
markets by examining how higher positions, i. e. professional/managerial posts (Cadres)
and senior managerial posts are filled.
Chapter 2 0f this paper reviews the preceding researches on the white-collar workers'
tenure and verifies by examining the proportions of tenure which labour markets, i. e.
1) Maurice, M, F. Seiller and J.J. Silvestre (1984)
2) Tachibanaki, T. (1998) ed.,
3) Beret, P. (1992)
4) Abraham, K. G. and H. S. Farber (1987), Altonji, J.G. and Shakotko (1987)
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internal or external, is more advantageous for being promoted to professional /
managerial posts. In section 1 and 2 of chapter 3, the analysis is narrowed to the group
with 12 0r more years of formal schooling (hereafter referred to as education) and
analyses by logit model those workers who were promoted to professional/managerial
posts during the 5 years from 1988 to 1993 in manufacturing sector and tertiary sector
respectively. Section 3 of chapter 3 analyses也e promotion from professional/managerial
posts to senior managerial posts. Chapter4 is the summary and conclusion of this paper.
2. WHITE-COLLAR WORKERS TENURE
This chapter reviews the preceding research on the white-collar workers tenure.
Koike (1991) who compared the workers'tenure in Japan and EC countries found out
that although job hopping is more common in EC countries compared to Japan, quite
a few workers do remain in one firm in Europe as well. Koike discovered that the
European white collar-workers in particular remain in one firm longer than Japanese
blue-collar workers of large firms. Based on these findings, Koike concludes that European
white-collar workers are often promoted by "seniority" and "life-time employment" is
quite common as well as " the mainstream type, of promotion for white-collar workers
is generally internal promotion both m Europe and Japan.
Table 1 is the structure of tenure of French male workers in manufacturing sector
extracted from the Structure of Earnings in Industryl972 which Koike used. It is evid-
ent from this table that there are greater number of white-collar workers whose tenure
is longer than that of blue-collar workers. However, in this data, it is possible that many
of the bleu-collar workers are promoted to such positions as foreman and technician
when they reach middle or advanced age and therefore are classified as white-collar
workers. It is highly possible that the difference in tenure between white-collar work-
ers and blue-collar workers arise from the difference in the age structure of white collar
workers and blue-collar workers.
In order to control the age factor's influence, table 2 compares the proportions of
tenure of blue・collar workers and white-collar workers who are between the age of 30
and 45. Looking at table 2 one could see that by controlling the age factor's effect to
a certain degree the number falls sharply in the blue-collar worker's group with less
than 5 years of tenure and white-collar worker's group with 20 or more years of tenure.
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Tablel
The Structure of Tenure of French Male Workers in Manufacturing Sector
White-collar workers and Blue-collar workers
Less than 2 years　　2-4　　　-　　10-19　morethan 20 years
Blue-collar　　　　　25.7　　　　　23.2　　19.2　　19.8　　　　　12 1
White collar　　　　13.0　　　　　17.1　　19.3　　　27.1　　　　　23 5
Source二1972 Structure of Earnings in Industry (EC)
Table2
The Structure of Tenure of French Male Workers in Manufacturing Sector
White-collar workers and Blue-collar workers from 30 to 45 Years Old
Less than 2 years　　-4　　ト9　10-19　morethan 20 years
Blue-collar　　　　　17.9　　　　　20.4　　　23.0　　　30.1　　　　　8.6
White collar　　　　　9.3　　　　15.0　　　23.7　　　38.5　　　　　13.5
Source : 1972 Structure of Earnings in Industry (EC)
Therefore, one can conclude that the tenure of blue-collar workers and white-collar
workers in tablel ware greatly influenced by the difference in age structure.
Next, let us examine separately the tenure of the white-collar workers who consist
mainly of those who might be promoted from blue-collar to foreman (Maitrise) and
those white-collar workers who are classified as professional/ managerial workers
(Cadre). The data used here is La Structure des salaires dans l'industrie en 1972.
The age proportions of professional/ managerial workers and foreman are shown in
table 3. However, one cannot see any significant difference in age proportions of the
two groups. When one looks at table 4 which shows the proportion of the tenure of the
two groups, 1. e. professional/ managerial workers and foreman, more than half of the
foremen served in one firm for more than 15 years but those foremen with tenure of
less than 5 years account for slightly less than 20%. On the other hand, in the case of
professional/ managerial workers, the tenure less than 5 years and more than 15 years
account for one third of the total respectively. When white-collar worker's tenure is
observed by separating the two groups, i. e. foremen and professional/ managerial work-
ers, one could see that in the case of professional/ managerial workers, although many
workers serve in one firm for relatively long years,仙ere are quite a few workers who
serve m one firm for relatively short years.
Professional/Managerial workers'tenure in the 1970s implies that there is one group
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Table3
The Structure of the Age in Manufacturing Sector in 1972
Professional/ managerial workers and Foreman
-29　　30-39　40-49　50-59
Professional/ managerial workers　10%　　28%　　35%　19%
Foreman　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　9%　　28%　　38%　19%
???? ? ? ??
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Table 4
The Structure of Tenure in Manufacturing Sector in 1972
Professional/ managerial workers and Foreman
?????????????????????????????
Professional/ managerial workers
Foreman
Note : Establishments with 10 employees or more in manufacturing and civil engineering and construction
industry.
Source : La Structure des salaires dans l'industrie en 1972, p.100
0f workers who pursue their career in internal labour markets and there is another
group of workers who develop their career in external labour markets as well. Howev-
er, by the transformation of industrial structure and the trends toward more advanced
education since the 1970s, the white-collar workers'labour markets might have undergone
subtle changes. Therefore, the next chapter will examine the characteristics of white-
collar's labour market in the 1990s by analysing the promotion to professional/managerial
posts.
3. THE MODEL OF ANALYSIS AND THE RESULT
This chapter analyses the promotion to professional/ managerial posts by using the
individual data of Formation et qualification professionnelle (FQP) which was conducted
in May 1993 by Institut National Statistique et des Etudes Economiques (INSEE).5'In
this analysis, individual data of the following category of workers is used: those male
French employees in private companies or state-owned companies who were between
the age of 20 to 64 and were also working as full-time employees at least for one year
without any interruption and on top of也at made a declaration of也eir earnings m 1992.
5) This individual data was offered by INSEE on condition that the data be used for academic research
purposes.
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Table5
Age, Tenure and Education of Workers Promoted to Professional/ Managerial Posts
Promoted Workers All Workers
Age　　　　　　37.5 ( 7.47)　　　　37.5 ( 8.06)
Tenure ll.1 (10.35)　　　12.70( 8.56)
Education　　　14.88( 2.08)　　　13.21( 1.59)
Note : Standard Deviations are shown in parentheses.
Source : FQP1993
Therefore, female workers, civil servants, self-employed people, immigrant workers
and part-time employees are not included in the analysis.
3-I Analysis of Promotion to Professional/ Manageria一 Posts in Manufacturing Sector
The subject of analysis in this section is French male full-time employees working in
manufacturing sector who had 12 or more years of education and had not yet promoted
to the ranks of professional/ managerial posts as of 1988. Let us look at table 5 and
examine the age, the tenure and the education of those workers who were promoted to
professional/ managerial posts during the 5 years from 1988 to 1993. The average tenure
of workers who were promoted is slightly shorter and the average year of education is
slightly longer compared to those of the sample as a whole. On the other hand, there is
almost no difference in the average age between sample as a whole and workers who
were promoted. However, when one turns one's attention to the standard deviation of
the age, the tenure and the education in parentheses of table 5, there is considerable
dispersion in the age, the tenure and the education of those who were promoted. The
cause of dispersion becomes apparent when the proportions of age and tenure are
examined closely. It is because most of the workers who were promoted were either in
their early 30s or late 40s and their tenure was either less than 5 years or 20 or more
years. This means that even in the 1990s, workers who were promoted to professional
/ managerial posts in manufacturing sector can be classified roughly into two-groups :
a group of internally promoted workers and a group of workers promoted from outside.
Moreover, there are a group of workers who were promoted in their early 30s and a
group of workers promoted in their late 40s.
Based on the characteristics observed above, the promotion to professional/ managerial
posts m manufacturing sector will be analysed by logit model. The dependent variable
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is promotion dummy variable in which workers who were promoted to professional/
managerial posts during the 5years since 1988 is 1 and workers who ware not promoted
during the same period is 0. Explanatory variables are age, tenure and education.
However, because promoted workers increase in two separate age groups, the age vana-
ble uses 4 terms and also because many of the promoted workers'tenure is either long
or short, the tenure variable uses the first term and second term. And higher education
is more advantageous to being promoted, the first term of education variable is used.
The equation, dependent variable and explanatory variables are as follows :
PR-I31 C+β2AG十β,AG2 +β4AG3 +β-,AG4十β. TENURE+βt TENURE2 +β8 TENURE
PR : dummy variable in which workers who were promoted to professional/
managerial posts during the 5years since 1988 is 1 and workers who ware not
promoted during the same period is 0.
C: Constant term
AG:Age
TENURE : Tenure
EDCTN: Education
β1-β : Parameters
Let us examine the result of analysis in table 6 which is aimed at large French firms
with 500 0r more employees. When one tests by likelihood ratio method whether the
age and the tenure have an effect upon promotion to professional/ managerial posts,
al也ough it is not shown in the table, null hypothesis of age and null hypothesis of tenure
are both rejected at the level of l%. Next, when one examines each coefficient, the first
and the third term of age variable are positive and second and fourth terms are negative.
And all of the four terms of the age variable are significant at 5%. From these facts,
one could conclude that biporarization of promotion age is statistically significant. In
the case of tenure, the first term is negative and the second term is positive and both
are significant at the level of l%, which means that promotion significantly bipolanzes
into a group of workers promoted from outside and a group of workers promoted internaレ
Iy. The education is significant at the level of 1% which means that longer education
becomes more advantageous to being promoted. From these phenomena, one could
conclude that the bipolarization of promotion which is seen in the age and the tenure
is due to the fact that the ways workers are promoted are diverse even in withm large
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Table6
Promotion to Professional/ Managerial Posts in Manufacturing Sector
Firms with 500 0r more employees
Observations: 201
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
C
AG
AG2
AG3
AG4
-1397.284*　　　　　　-1.966546
148.4053ネ　　　　　　1.980241
-5.869183* *　　　　　-2.002860
0」LO1864* *　　　　　　2.024350
-0.000655* *　　　　　　-2.044957
TENURE　　　　- 0.423578*　　　　　　- 2.586925
TENURE2　　　　0.015625* * *　　　　　2.832747
EDCTN 0.512651* * *　　　　　2.993559
Log likelihood　-35.9
Obs with Dep-1 14
Obs with Dep-0 187
Fraction of correct predictions 0.92
蝣Significant at 1% level. *・Significant at 5% level.
Significant at 10% level.
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manufacturing firms.
The probability of promotion to professional/ managerial posts in large manufactur-
ing firms is strong when workers are either in their early 30s or on their late 40s, and
is also strong when workers'tenure is either very short or very long. This suggests that
groups with different attributes exist within workers who occupy the professional/
managerial posts in large manufacturing firms.
Let us consider here the primary factors which contribute to the diversity in the way
workers are promoted to professional/ managerial posts by examining the personal
data of workers. Table 7 is a summary of personal data of workers who were promoted
to professional/ managerial posts during the 5 years from 1988 to 1993 and who belong
to firms with 500 0r more employees. The data is divided into two sections: personal
data of workers who are less than 40 years old and personal data of workers who are
40 0r more years old. Let us first look at the personal data of workers who were
promoted when they were in their 30s which is summarised in table 7. The average age
is 32.5, average years of education is 15.6 and the average annual income is 179.425
franc. And the types of job are sales representative, clerical work /management, R&D
and maintenance. On the other hand, there are 6 workers who were promoted when they
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were in their 40s. Their average age is 46.8, the average years of education is 13.8 and
the average annual income is 185.875 franc. Those six workers were all managers in
production department. The difference in the average years of education of workers in
their 40s and workers in their 30s and the difference in the average income of workers
in their 40s and 30s are not significant. Next, let us look at the personal data from the
perspective of internal promotion and promotion from outside. In the case of workers
who were promoted in their 30s, 3 workers out of 8 were promoted internally and 5
workers were promoted from outside. On the other hand, all of the six workers who
were in their 40s were promoted internally. When one examines separately the personal
data of internally promoted workers in their 30s and workers promoted from outside in
their 30s, in the case of workers promoted internally, the average age is 33, the aver-
age year of education is 13.7 and the average annual income is 138.721 franc. In the case
of workers promoted from outside, the average age is 32,仇e average years of education
is 16.8 and the average annual income is 203.721 franc. When one tests if也ere is a differ-
ence in the education of internally promoted workers and workers promoted from
outside, the null hypothesis of average years of education of both types of workers be-
ing equal is rejected at the significant level of 10%. Also, the null hypothesis of aver-
age annual income of workers promoted from inside and that of workers promoted from
ourside being equal is rejected at the significant level of 1%. This means that those
workers promoted from outside have significantly higher education and higher average
annual income compared to workers internally promoted.
Based on the analysis of this section, if one asks for a reason why workers who were
promoted to professional/ managerial posts in manufacturing sector diverge into two
groups, i.e. a group of workers in their early 30s and a group of workers in their late
40s, one could conclude that it is because different systems of promotion exist in produc-
tion department and other departments respectively. This implies that firm-specific
human capital which can only be acquired through long tenure is demanded for produc-
tion managers. On the other hand, in the case of workers who were promoted in their
30s, there are both internal promotion and promotion from outside. Many of the work-
ers who were promoted to professional/ managerial posts from outside were technicians
who obtained advanced education. They had longer years of education and their earn-
ings were higher compared to internally promoted workers.
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Table 7
Personal Data of Promoted Workers
Firms with 500 0r more employees
Less than 40 years
第6巻第1号
Age Education Promotion Tenure Department Earnings
??????????? ???? ???????????????? ? ????
Internal
Internal
Internal
External
External
External
Externa l
Externa l
14　　　　　　Sales
Co mp uter
1 1 Administration
R&D
Sales
R&D
Maintenance
Sales
120.000
141.164
155.000
174.000
192.000
200.000
203.235
250.000
More than 40 Years
Age Education Promotion Tenure Department Earnings
???????????? ???? ??????????
Internal
Interna l
Interna l
Interna l
Internal
Internal
23　　　　Transport
28　　　　Prdctn Cntrl
Production
28　　　　Production
26　　　　Production
27　　　　Production
140.000
154.000
166.000
166.252
209.000
280.000
Note : *indicates tenure after transfer within the current firm.
Source : FQP1993
3-2 Ana一ysis of Promotion to Professional/ Managerial Posts in Tertiary Sector
This section analyses the structure of promotion to professional/ managerial posts in
tertiary sector. The selection criterion of sample is the same as the manufacturing sector.
Table 8 shows the average age, the average tenure and average year of education of
workers who were promoted to professional/ managerial posts during the 5 years from
1988 to 1993. Promoted workers average age is slightly higher and their average years
of education is slightly longer but their average tenure is slightly shorter compared to
the sample as a whole. Incidentally, compared to promoted workers in manufacturing
sector, promoted workers in tertiary sector have slightly higher age and the tenure and
the years of education are slightly shorter. When one observes the age proportion of
promoted workers, more than 80% of promoted workers are in their 30s and 40s and
about half of the promoted workers tenure is less than 5 years.
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Table
Age, Tenure and Education of Workers Promoted to Professional/ Managerial Posts
Promoted Workers All Workers
39.2(7.5)　　　　　37.2(8.0)
10.2(9.3)　　　　　11.6(8.4)
Age
Tenure
Education　　　　　14.5(2.1)　　　　　13.3(1.7)
Note : Standard Deviations are shown in parentheses.
Source : FQP1993
Table9
Promotion to Professional/ Managerial Posts in Tertiary Sector
Firms wi仇500 0r more employees
Observations: 160
Variable Coefficient T-Statistic
C　　　　　　　　　　　-31.25400* *　　　　　　-2.262966
AG 1.498210* *　　　　　　2.128720
AG2　　　　　　　　　-0.017867*　　　　　　-2.031053
TENURE　　　　　　- 0.239823　　　　　　　- 1.617871
TENURE2　　　　　　　0.007132　　　　　　　1.335053
EDCTN　　　　　　　- 0.027961　　　　　　- 0.155058
Log likelihood -36.06851
Obs with Dep-1　　　11
Obs wi仙Dep-　　　　149
Fraction of correct predctions 0.93
* * Significant at 5% level.
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Based on the characteristics which were observed above, the promotion to professional
/ managerial posts will be analysed by logit model. Explanatory variables are the same
as before except that也e age variable has only two terms in stead of four.
Let us look at the result of analysis of large firms with 500 0r more employees.
When one tests by likelihood ratio method whether也e age and the tenure have an effect
upon the promotion to professional/ managerial posts, although it is not shown m the
table, the null hypothesis of age is rejected at the level of 5% and the null hypothesis
of tenure is not rejected. When one examines each coefficient in table 9, the coefficient
of the first term and second term of age is significant at the level of 5% and 10%
respectively. From the value of the first term and s∝ond term, one could find out that
probability of promotion reaches its highest level when workers are in也eir early 40s.
On the other hand, the coefficients of tenure variables are not significant. Moreover,
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Table 10
Personal Data of Promoted Workers
Firms with 500 0r more employees
第6巻第1号
Age Education Promotion Tenure Industries Earnings
???????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
Externa l
External
Interna l
External
Interna l
Interna l
lnterna l
Interna l
lnterna l
Interna l
Interna l ?
?????????????????
???????????????ー?
C ommerce
Commerce
Service
Commer ce
Transport
Transport
Commerce
Transport
Commerce
Service
Finance
?????????????????????
??〔????????????? ?
????????????
????? ??
??????
Note : * indicates tenure after transfer within the current firm.
Source : FQP1993
the coefficient of education is not significant either.
Table 10 shows the personal data of eleven promoted workers of large firms in tertia-
ry sector. The average age of the promoted workers is 39.9, the average years of educa-
tion is 13.5 and the average annual income is 153.714 franc. Out of the eleven workers,
eight workers were internally promoted and three workers were promoted from outside.
When one compares the age, the years of education and the wage of internally promoted
workers and those who were promoted from outside, the average age is 40.9, the aver-
age years of education is 13.4 and average annual income is 166.832 franc in the case
of internally promoted workers and the average age is 37.3, the average years of educa-
tion is 14 and也e average annual income is 118.733 franc in也.e case of workers promoted
from outside.
When one tests the difference in the average age, average years of education and
average annual income between the two groups, i. e. internally promoted workers and
workers promoted from outside, one can not see any significant difference in the case
of the average age and education but the null hypothesis仇at the average annual income
of the two groups are equal is rejected at the significant level of 5%. In tertiary sector
the average annual income of workers promoted from outside is significantly lower than
that of the internally promoted workers. This result is contrary to that of manufactur-
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Tablell
Age, Tenure and Education of Workers Promoted to Senior Manager
Promoted WorkersAll professional/
Managerial workers
Age　　　　　　　　　40.2 (6.0)　　　　　　44.9 (7.8)
Tenure　　　　　　　　8.8 (7.0)　　　　　　13.1 (9.6)
Education　　　　　　16.7 (3.0)　　　　　　16」 (2.6)
Note : Standard Deviations are shown in parentheses.
Source : FQP1993
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ing sector. When one looks at promoted workers by industry, workers who were promoted
from outside are confined to commercial sector.
3-3 Analysis of Promotion to Senior Management Posts (head of a department)
This section analyses the workers who were promoted from professional/ managerial
posts to heads of a department. The subject of the analysis is a group of male regular
employees who had 12 or more years of education and had already been ranked as
professional/ managerial posts as of 1988.
Firstly, let us look at the average age,仇e average tenure and the average years of
education of workers who were promoted. The promoted workers'average age and
average tenure are slightly lower compared to those of the sample as a whole but one
cannot see any large difference in the years of education of promoted workers and that
of the sample as a whole. Secondly, although it is not shown in table ll, when one
observes也e age and the proportion of tenure, about 60% of the promoted workers
were promoted between也e age of 35 and 44 and slightly more血an 90% of the promoted
workers tenure is either less than 5 years or between 10 years and 20.
Here, promotion to senior manager will be analysed by logit model which uses age,
tenure, education and technical dummy as explanatory variables. The analysis is
conducted for all of the industries as well as tertiary sector. Those samples of workers
who work for firms with less than 10 employees are excluded from the analysis. As far
as the promoted workers'tenure is concerned, there are two different periods where
concentration of promoted workers can be seen i. e. less than 5 years and between 10
and 20 years, and also the number of promoted workers decreases when their tenure is
more than 20 years. Therefore, three terms for tenure variable are used in the analysis.
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The technical dummy is added to the explanatory variables and by doing so whether
the probability of promotion from technical workers to senior managers is different from
that of non technical workers to senior manager is verified. The equation, dependent
variable and explanatory variables are as follows.
PR-β C+&AG+β蝣AG2+/34 TENURE+β^ TENURE2+& TENURE3 +07EDCTN+/3s CS38
+&NN
Pic : dummy variable in which workers who were promoted to senior manager during
5 years since 1988 is 1 and workers who ware not promoted during the same period
is O.
C: Constant term
AG:Age
TENURE : Tenure
EDCTN: Education
C538 : technical dummy in which technical workers (ingenieur) are 1
non technical workers are 0
〃Ⅳ: firm size dummy; workers who work for firms with 500 0r more employees are 1
workers who work for firms less than 500 employees are 0.
β1-β9 : Parameters
Firstly, when one tests by likelihood ratio method whether the explanatory variables
of age and tenure have an effect upon the promotion to senior manager, although it is
not shown in the table, the null hypothesis of age is not rejected and the null hypothesis
of tenure is rejected at the level 10%. Secondly, when one examines each coefficient
shown in table 12, all the three terms of the coefficient of tenure and the technical
dummy are all signific血t at the level of 5%. The first term of tenure is negative, its
second term is positive and its third term is negative. This means that the promotion
to senior manager can be divided into two groups, i. e. those workers who were promoted
from outside and those workers internally promoted. The fact that the third term of
tenure is significantly negative implies that promotion to senior manager become graduaレ
Iy disadvantageous when the tenure exceeds a certain number of years. The technical
dummy variable shows that the probability of promotion of technical workers is significant-
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Table12
Promotion to Senior Manager
Whole Sector
Obset・-vations : 225
Variable Coefficient　　　　　　　-Statistic
-10.85105
0.501606
- 0.006796
TENURE　　　　　　- 0.890651* '
TENURE2　　　　　　　0.099848"
TENURE3　　　　　　- 0.002942*
EDCTN 0.073050
CS38　　　　　　　　　- 2.505677日
NN 0.471336
- 0.760647
0.728260
-0.814185
-2.097887
2.094841
- .053253
0.6240 5
- 2.287622
0.668319
Log likelihood　　　　　　　-38.43245
Obs with Dep-1　　　　　　　　　13
Obs with Dep-0　　　　　　　　　212
Fraction of correct predictions 0.94
Significant at 5% level
V)
ly lower compared to that of non technical workers. On the other hand, both the coeffici-
ent of age and the coefficient of education are not significant.
Next, let us examine the result of analysis in tertiary sector. When one tests by
likelihood ratio method whether the age and the tenure have an effect upon the promo-
tion to senior manager, although it is not shown in the table, the null hypothesis of age
is rejected at the level of 5%. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of tenure is not
rejected. When one examines the significance of each coefficient, the first and second
terms of age variable are significant. This means that there is a concentration of promo-
tion to senior manager at a certain age bracket. The first and second terms of tenure
are both significant at the level of 10%. On the other hand, the third term of tenure
coefficient and the technical dummy are negative but not significant.
Table 14 shows the personal data of workers who were promoted to senior manager
in large firms during the five years from 1988 to 1993. Let us consider the characteristics
of workers who were promoted to senior manager. Out of 9 workers who were promoted
to senior managers, one worker is in manufacturing sector, one worker is in civil engineer-
ing and construction and 7 workers are in tertiary sector. Their average age is 41.1,
average years of education is 16.7 and the average annual income is 338.889 franc. Out
40
Observations: 133
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Table 13
Promotion to Senior Manager
Tertiary Sector
Vari ab le Coefficient T-Statistic
C　　　　　　　　　　-53.45969*
AG　　　　　　　　　　2.596377*
AG2　　　　　　　　　-0.033199*
TENURE　　　　　　-0.906200*
TENURE2　　　　　　　0.093382 '
TENURE3　　　　　　-0.002503
EDCTN 0.138100
CS38　　　　　　　　　- 1.666748
NN 1.070129
-1.757963
1.723404
-1.763425
- 1.752796
1.694870
-1.580061
0.938649
-1393141
1.127222
Log likelihood　　　　　　　-24.56325
Obs with Dep-l
Obs with Dep-0　　　　　　　　124
Fraction of correct predictions 0.93
* Significant at 10% level
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of 9 promoted workers, 6 workers were internally promoted and 3 workers were promoted
from outside. In the case of internally promoted workers, the average age is 40.8, the
average years of education is 16.8 and the average annual income is 319.666. 0n the other
hand, in the case of workers promoted from outside, the average age is 41.7, the aver-
age years of education is 16.6 and average annual income is 377.333. One cannot discern
any significant difference between internally promoted workers and workers promoted
from outside regarding the average age, the average years of education and average
income. As far as workers who were promoted from outside are concerned, two work-
ers are in wholesale business, one is a technical manager in civil engineering and construe-
tion industry. Similarly to the workers who are promoted to professional/ managerial
posts from outside, they are either technical manager or manager in commercial sector.
These phenomena imply that for technical workers there exist external labour markets
where general human capital is highly valued. Moreover, according to OECD (1993), the
tenure by industry has borderless commonness and in any OECD countries tenure is
shorter in civil engineering and construction industry and commerce compared to
manufacturing sector. This section's analysis implies that in commercial sector, even in
the case of large firms, external labour markets are quite dominant.
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Table 14
Personal Data of Workers Promoted to Senior Manager
Firms with 500 or more Employees
41
Age Education Promotion Tenure Industries Function Earnings
??????????????? ?? ? ?????????? ?? ???? ? ?? ?
Interna l
Interna l
Internal
lnterna l
External
External
Extern a l
Interna l
Internal
11　Manufacturing Administrator　　168.000
1 3　　Finance Administrator　　　240.000
17　　Transport Engineer　　　　　250.000
16　　　Commerce Administrator　　　300.000
Co mmerce Administrator　　　328.000
Co mmerce Administrator　　　384.000
Co nstructi on Engineer　　　　　420.000
2 1　　Service Administrator　　　450.000
1 3　　　Service Administrator　　　5 10.000
Source : FQP1993
Lastly, let us examine the difference in the average age and the average years of
education of workers promoted to professional/ managerial posts and those promoted
to senior managers in large firms in tertiary sector. The average age of workers
promoted to professional/ managerial posts is 39.9 and that of workers promoted to
senior manager is 41.1 and therefore there is no significant difference between the two
groups. On the other hand, the average year of education of workers promoted to
professional/ managerial posts is 13.5 and that of workers promoted to senior manager
is 16.7. and the null hypothesis that the years of education of two groups being equal is
rejected at the significant level of 5%. This means that there is no continuity between
those who are promoted to professional/ managerial posts and those who are promoted
to senior managers.
4. SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
In this section the result of the analysis is summarised. In manufacturing sector, work-
ers who are promoted to professional/ managerial posts bipolanze into two groups
concerning both the age and the tenure. This bipolanzation in age and in tenure at
which workers are promoted implies that in large firms in manufacturing sector, differ-
ent kinds of promotion systems exist and workers with different attributes are promoted
to professional/ managerial posts.
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Workers who were promoted in their 30s can be divided into those who are internal-
ly promoted and those who are promoted from outside. Many of the workers who were
promoted from outside are engaged in R&D and sales department and they received
more advanced education and earn higher wages than internally promoted workers. On
the other hand, workers who were promoted when they were in their 40s were all internal-
ly promoted and they all belong to production department.
If one interprets the above phenomena from human capital point of view, one could
surmise that for professional/ managerial posts in production department, firm-specific
human capital is highly valued and in R&D and in sales department, general human
capital is highly valued. One could also surmise from the supply and demand point of
view, that the job hoppers in technical workers could move under a favourable condi-
tions due to the labour shortage of technical workers occurred in the 1980s.6'On the
other hand, in large firm in tertiary sector, the number of workers who were promoted
from outside is smaller than workers who were internally promoted and they earn low-
er wages compared to internally promoted workers. All of the workers who were
promoted from outside are in commercial sector. In large firms in tertiary sector, internal-
ly promoted workers are greater in number and are also at an advantageous position
regarding wages compared to workers promoted from outside.
As far as promotion to senior managers is concerned, there are both workers promoted
from outside and workers internally promoted. However, workers promoted from outside
are confined to technical managers in civil engineering and construction industry and
managers m commercial sector. This phenomenon coincides with that of manufacturing
sector where those who ware promoted to professional/ managerial posts from outside
were technical workers and that of tertiary sector where many of the workers were
promoted to professional/ managerial posts from outside are commercial sector. These
analysis suggests that for technical workers there exist external labour markets where
general human capital is highly valued and also that in commercial sector the mechan-
ism of external labour markets is dominant at a wide range of sphere including even
the managers of large firms.
If one characterises the white-collar workers labour markets in France based on these
analysis, one could say that though there exist a variety of routes for promotion of
white-collar workers, many of the managers are still internally promoted if one excludes
6) Grandjean, C. (1987)
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technical workers and managers in commercial sector. In the late 1980s, the white-collar
workers coefficient of ten∬e in wage functions became negative. However, this phenomenon
might be caused by the labour shortage of technical workers in the 1980s. The promo-
tion analysis shows that the promotion of white-collar workers in large French firms
remains centred around internal labour markets.
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